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Non-Linear Development. 
Studies of political development are often undertaken 
with the assumption that the various institutions of a 
developing society change at uniform and similar rates, or 
that at least the relations among these institutions are 
homeostatic. This approach overlooks an important and well 
documented source of variance, viz., the differential rates 
of change of various parts of society requiring adaptations 
in other parts of society, and the potential delays in these 
required adaptations. 
1 
A requisite for the integration of political systems 
is the linkage of large numbers of individuals through 
channels of social communication so that the heritage asso- 
ciated with the common characteristics of the members of the 
system may be shared and provide a basis for symbolic 
identification. * Cybernetic models of polities have postu- 
lated that communication is the cement which binds together 
3 the units of political organization.. 
Few people can observe at first hand the sequence 
of acts which constitute even a small segment of 
the political process; men must depend instead 
upon a communication system to provide them with 
a comprehension of the substance of politics at 
any particular time. It is through the organi- 
zation of the communications process that the 
host of random actions which represent the pursuit 
of power by people throughout a society are placed 
in some form of relationship with each other; that 
order is established in the sphere of power con- 
siderations and a society finds that it has a 
polity. 4 
Although political development is a complex phenomenon, 
recent literature has conceptualized it as consisting of 
three phases; the traditional, the.transitiona1, and the 
modern. In the first phase, there is a low degree of occu- 
pational differentiation in the local political community.. 
The definition of the citizen role is based upon religious, 
ethnic or regional affiliations, and political communication 
takes place through networks of interpersonal contacts. Thus, 
in the American case, Tocqueville noted that the activities 
of political notables were a common topic of conversation. 5 
In a modern system, on the other hand, the populace is 
greatly differentiated occupationally, and the definition 
of the citizen role becomes more cosmopolitan in the sense 
that it necessarily includes as fellow citizens individuals 
who live far away, who are of different ethnic or religious 
stock, and so forth. This difference is the basis of many of 
the problems faced by previously stateless new nations. 6 
The increased complexity of the social order has two major 
consequences for the flow of political communication. First, 
the range of interpersonal contact among individuals becomes 
more occupationally limited.' Persons who are in close touch 
with political matters come into contact with others who are 
similarly knowledgeable about politics, while individuals 
who are less involved with politics are insulated from inter- 
personal political communication. Since the rediscovery of 
the primary group reported by the publication of Katz' and 
Lazarsfeld's study of influence among housewives in Decatur, 
Illinois, it has been assumed that political news was diffused 
among the populace through a "two-step" flow of communication 
whereby opinion leaders were influenced by the media of mass 
communications and themselves influenced others through inter- 
personal contact. It must be noted, however, that in the 
field of public affairs, there was a "lower rate of confirmed 
contact and role corroboration" than there were in the other 
in£ luence spheres considered by the authors. The assumption 
of interpersonal political communication in urban industrial 
society, then, remains to be validated. We do know that a 
1964 survey in Detroit revealed that "Almost two-thirds (63 per 
cent) of the general population sample ... reported that they 
had neither asked nor been asked for opinions on a major news 
topic during the week or two prior to being interviewed." 
9 
A second consequence of the increased division of labor 
in society is that a communications industry develops and 
becomes differentiated, on the bases of both personnel and 
technology, from other sectors of society. While the rela- 
tively low level of interpersonal political communication 
which persists cannot provide the integrative force necessary 
in a complex modern society, particularly in terms of national- 
istic rather than localistic citizen roles, the agencies of. 
mass communication can, and do, fulfill this function. 
The characteristics of the transitional stage cannot 
be delimited as clearly, for this stage can only be defined 
in terms of the other two. Thus, Pye suggests that the key 
structural consideration at this stage is the "bifurcated and 
fragmented" nature of the communications system. " . . .It 
usually involves in varying degrees one system which is based 
upon modern technology, is urban-centered, and reaches the 
more Westernized segments of the population, and also a 
separate complex system which conforms in varying degrees to 
traditional systems in-that it depends upon face-to-face 
relations and tends to follow the patterns of social and 
communal .life. (1 10 
It is our contention that this formulation of communica- 
tion systems in transitional societies is overly simplistic, 
for it assumes that as soon as urban centers develop, agencies 
of-mass communication spring up and are immediately capable 
of fulfilling the-integrative function of political communica- 
tion. The concentration of dense populations in urban centers 
with highly differentiated occupational structures creates 
the necessity for mass communications institutions, but there 
is a lag between the development of this demand and its ful- 
fillment. We hypothesize that at that point of time at which 
the political community has become too differentiated to be 
successfully integrated by face-to-face political communica- 
tion, and before the agencies of mass communication evolve, 
there will be a decrease in the level of political involve- 
ment of the population, and an increase in the scope of 
governmental power. 
There have, in fact, been a series of cross-national 
studies which lend credence to the notion that communications 
development lags somewhat behind the increasing complexity 
of social structures. Cutright, in a study involving data 
from 77 nations, found a high association (r = .81) between 
communication and political development, and that the most 
parsimonious equation for predicting development involved 
only urbanization and communication as independent variables. 11 
This study does not confront the issue of popular electoral 
participation, nor does it differentiate between interpersonal 
and mass communications. 
12 
We shall see below, however, that 
the relationship between urbanization and communication has 
important implications for the understanding of the political 
structures of the American states, as well as for cross- 
national comparisons. 
Daniel Lerner comes closer to addressing the question of 
participation when he speaks of two phases of mobilization. 
He argues that in the first phase, urbanization increases 
in society and, with it, production and availability of com- 
munication media also increase. l3 This may be considered the 
media production phase. 
In the second phase, literacy, which has grown under the 
influence of urbanization, leads to increased media use. 
This may be regarded as the consumption phase. Lerner's 
measure of media use is based upon mass communications: news- 
papers, radio and cinema. Media use, in turn, is a predictor 
of political participation.' Thus, although he is concerned 
with differences in average voting turnout among nations 
rather than trends within any given nation, Lerner validates 
our.assumption that information flow is related to popular 
participation in political life. 
In a more recent study, McCrone and Cnudde apply a 
refinement of Lerner's thesis to the data utilized by Cut- 
right. Causal relations are inferred from the correlations 
among Cutright's indices, and path analysis is used to demon- 
strate the indirect linkage between urbanization and political 
development. 
14 
Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, increased 
urbanization leads to increased education; increased education 
leads to more widespread use of mass communications; when mass 
communications permeates society, democratic political 
development occurs. The direct linkage between urbanization 
and political development is negligible. 
Figure 1. McCrone-Cnudde model of democratic political devel- 
opment, with path coefficients. 
Education 
1.85 
Urbanization ...... .................,> Political Development 
.07 & 
Communications /8 0 
SOURCE: Adapted from McCrone and Cnudde, op. cit. 
All of these studies are based upon cross-section data 
from nations in the contemporary world. After looking at 
our own concerns in terms of the developing nations, we shall 
apply the same formulations to intrasocietal differences to 
see if the hypothesized dynamics appear there as well. In 
this regard, the United States, as the "first new nation" 
shall serve as our example. 
15 
Characteristics of Mass Society. 
One of the primary definitive-characteristics of mass 
society in Kornhauser's formulation is that there is high 
availability of a population for mobilization by elites. 
16 
For such availability to exist, individuals must be related 
to each other not by common interests, but must rather base 
their relationship solely upon responsibility to a common 
authority. Where local involvements do not insulate them 
from such authority, they are subject to manipulation by 
the elites through nationally centralized organizations and 
communications media. 17 
Kornhauser does not argue that the growth of agencies 
of large scale communications necessarily expedites such 
manipulation, and it is assumed that local relations among 
media, consumers, advertisers, etc., rather than centraliza- 
tion of control, may dominate the structure of the communica- 
tions industry. Therefore, it is proposed that just as a 
plurality of interpersonal interests can prevent the 
development of mass society by integrating the system at the 
local level, so can large scale pluralistic communications 
media serve this function. It is assumed that as social 
structure generally becomes more complex, political institu- 
tions will likewise increase in complexity and scope. In the 
absence of mediating influence, then, a great deal of power-- 
power generally justified as being utilized "in the public 
interestn--will come to be concentrated in political institu- 
tions not responsibile to a popular electoral base. l8 m e n  
institutions exist that can mobilize popular political parti-. 
cipation, however, then power is shared by the electorate. 
Integrative Communications and Mass Society. 
As populations shift from rural to urban areas and the 
economy becomes structurally more complex, traditional net- 
works of interpersonal communication are disrupted. We 
propose that in the absence of alternative integrating 
factors, involvement in the polity will decrease, and the 
scope of a government will increase, despite the fact that 
urbanization itself facilitates political participation. The 
question of defining such functional alternatives, however, 
remains an open one. An implicit notion in both the Lerner 
and McCrone formulations is that the written media can ful- 
fill the communications function. We woulc? reject this 
formulation on two grounds. 
First, those segments of the population that are in fact 
highly educated and literate enough to read and understand the 
political content of the media are also those that fill elite 
niches in the social structure and hence are in contact with 
political events through the emergence of new interpersonal 
networks. Thus, the media system is superimposed upon a set 
of face-to-face relations for the upper social strata, while 
the less literate lower social strata have neither inter- 
personal nor media contact with political events. Even in the 
United States, with its relatively high level of literacy, we 
find the lower social strata reporting little political 
information obtained through the mass media, and in fact a 
distrust of the written media. 
19 
Second, there is an important difference among media in 
the degree to which the individual user participates in the 
communication process. In face-to-face political information 
flow, the-.individual is active, and therefore involved.. When 
he reads a newspaper, however, he.is passive. The intensity 
of. the printed message is primary here. We assume that parti- 
cipation in the various spheres of social life is a cumula- 
tive process. That is, people who participate in some areas 
tend to participate in others as well. 20 Thus, we would. 
expect "participatory" media exposure to be functionally 
equivalent to face-to-face contact. 
McLuhan suggests that television, like speech, is a 
21 "cool" medium. Both are high in receiver participation. 
We,would expect then that as populations became concentrated 
in urban areas, political participation would be facilitated 
by the existence of television. 
Integrative Communication and Popular Participation. 
The studies cited above demonstrate positive relation- 
ships between urbanization and political development. Indeed, 
the cross-national data collected by the Yale political data 
program indicate that the relationship between urbanization 
and voting turnout is higher for the developing nations 
(r = . 6 4 )  than for the total universe of nations for which 
data are available (r = . 3 8 ) .  Were we to posit a strictly 
linear causal model, the data would subgest that. both televi- 
sion and voting turnout were consequents of urbanization,.and 
that television has little effect as an intervening variable 
(see figure 2). 
Figure 2. Zero-order correlations among urbanization;tele- 







r = .41 
I 
lting Turnout 
*Urbanization is measured by the per cent of the 
population residing in cities of 20,000 or more, 
television density by the number of television 
sets per 1,000 people and voting turnout as the 
per cent of voting age population appearing at 
the polls. 
SOURCE: Bruce M. Russett et al., World Handbook 
of Political and Social Indicators (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964). 
However, we posit interaction effects that lead us to 
reject linear causal models. On the one hand, urbanization 
per se is not a perfect indicator of economic development 
and increased societal complexity. Where urbanization 
merely represents the territorial concentration of people 
without a rejection of traditional patterns of communica- 
tion, voting turnout would increase even in the absence of 
television due to the relative ease of mobilizing concen- 
trated populations. On the other hand, where television is 
found in the absence of high degrees of urbanization, it 
might be taken as indicative of increased social structural 
complexity in the absence of urban facilitation: a situation 
that may lead to reduced turnout rates. This, we presume, 
would be the case in a "modern agricultural" state, where 
modern technologies have been adopted, but where the resource 
base makes agriculture a more efficient means of production 
than manufacturing. Rather than assume that a shift from 
extractive to manufacturing industries is a necessary compo- 
nent of modernization, we leave the nature of this relation- 
ship unresolved. 
Table 1 presents mean rates of voter turnout when condi- 
tions of television density and urbanization vary. Note 
that, as predicted, turnout decreases among countries with 
a low degree of urbanization as television density increases, 
and that television seems to have a powerful effect among 
highly urbanized nations. 
Table 1. Mean voting turnout in developing nations, by tele- 
vision density and urbanization., 
Low television density High television density 
( L 6  sets/1,000 pop'n.) ( 2 6  sets/l,000 pop'n.) 
Low 4 3 . 3 %  
Urbanization (n=8) 
High 5 1 . 3 %  
Urbanization (n=7) 
While multivariate analyses with small case bases tend 
to be statistically inconclusive, an anlysis of variance 
of the data in table 1 is useful in describing- the factors 
operating here. Earlier studies demonstrate that urbanism 
is an important determinant of political involvement. Our 
aim here'is to show that in addition, an important inter- 
action effect exists between urbanization and television. 
Table 2 presents an analysis of.variance of the data in 
table 1. Clearly the strongest effect is that of urbaniza- 
tion, and the effect of television itself is minimal. How- 
ever, the effect of interaction between urbanization and 
television is an important one: the mean square attributable 
to interaction effects is almost three times as large as that 
due to television itself. 
Table 2. Analysis of variance of voting turnout scores presented 
in table 1. 
Source of Variation Mean Square Degrees of Freedom F P 
Urbanization 3,174.4 1 9.04 d .O1 
Television 488.0 1 1.39 N.S. 
Interaction 1,315.3 1 3.74 <.lo 
Within Class 350.9 24 
We have suggested above that urbanization itself is not a 
good index pf social structural complexity because of the possi- 
bility of structurally undifferentiated urban concentrations, 
as for example in the case of Egypt. 22  Industrialization 
is a better indicator of structural differentiation, and 
table 3 presents mean rates of voting turnout when industrial- 
ization and television density are varied. Television again 
is related to reduced turnout in countries of low industrial- 
ization, and to increased turnout in countries of high 
industrialization. Moreover, we see here that where tele- 
vision density is low, increased social differentiation leads 
to decreased voting turnout. 
Table 3. Mean voting turnout in developing nations, by television 
density and urbanization. 
Low television density High television density 
Low 59.5% 
Industrialization (n=6) 
High 46.2% 68 .4% 
Industrialization (n=5) (n=5) 
This effect is clear if we compare scatter diagrams of 
the relationship between industrialization and voting turnout 
in low and high television density nations, although again, 
the small case base for which complete data are available 
prevents us from drawing mathematically precise conclusions 
on the nature of the relationship. Note that in figure 3a, 
for nations where television density is low, voting.turnout 
appears to be inversely related to industrialization,.,while 
in figure 3b, the high television density condition,'the 
Figure 3. Industrialization and voting turnout, by television density. 
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relationship is a direct one. 
These data suggest three refinements of social science 
theory relating to the developing nations. First, we find 
that the relationship between economic development and 
political development (especially political democracy) is 
not a linear one, nor is it in all cases positive. The 
limitations on this relationship warrant further study. 
2 3  
Secondly, we find support here for Lerner's thesis that 
the balance of rates of growth in various sectors of society 
is a more important indicator of modernization than is develop- 
ment along any single dimension, and that "excessive growth in 
one phase of modern life, as compared with other phases, often 
does more harm than good." 
2 4  
Third, as a further specification of the above point, if 
the economic development of society and its concomitantly 
increasing social structural complexity surpass the ability 
of relevant mass communication systems to integrate a differ- 
entiated population into the body politic, then involvement 
and participation in political life will indeed decrease, and 
the detachment of the populace from the political process 
renders it open to potential mobilization by counter-elites 
who may capitalize on disaffection with the status quo; 25 
Integrative Communication and Scope of Government. 
If these patterns represent important dynamics in politi- 
cal integration, then they should describe the-institutional 
structure of politics as well as the 1evel.of popular 
participation, and should be found in the developed,-as well 
as in the developing nations. Data are available to test the 
structural corollaries to the above hypotheses in the United 
States. 
In electoral terms, we have defined mass society as being 
characterized by citizen disengagement. With regard to 
political structure, we will define mass society as a social 
system that is explicitly committed to the i2eal of competitive 
participatory democracy while at the same time having a 
"totalitarian" government, which serves as the "sole value- 
producing, distributing, and consuming institution.. "26  This 
has been referred to in the literature as broad "scope of 
government." 
We hypothesize that in the presence of integrative com- 
munication channels, as society becomes more complex, the 
scope of government will decrease, as citizens both make more 
decisions themselves, and place greater constraints on their 
government. When such channels of communication are not 
available,,however, scope of government will increase as a 
function of structural complexity. 
A recent factor-analytic study of comparative political 
development in the American states provides us with data 
relevant for the testing of these hypotheses. Three factors 
emerging from this study provide us with operational indica- 
tors of government sturcture, systemic complexity, and 
integrative communication. 
27  
1. Government structure. A factor emerged from the 
analysis that was labelled (after Agger et al.) "scope of 
government." Variables loading positively on this factor 
were tax level per capita (.68), tax level per income unit 
(.82), spending level per capita (.76), and government 
employment (.77). Of further interest is the fact that both 
voting (.IS) and party competition (.lo) had low loading on 
this factor. 
2. Systemic complexity. In the case of the new nations, 
we discussed urbanization and industrialization as indicators 
of social differentiation. In the present case we are con- 
cerned with a factor labelled "metro-urbanism." Among the 
variables with high positive loadings on this factor were 
urbanization (.76), population (.87), executive salaries 
(.go), ethnic diversity (.70), proportion in white collar 
occupations ( .57) . 
3. Integrative communication. Here, the study of 
American states yielded a factor labelled "integrative 
message exchange." Among the variables with high positive 
loadings were education (.68), television sets (.77),,tele- 
phones (.go), automobiles (.68). It is notable that despite 
the loading of education on this factor, newspaper circulation 
did not load highly on it (.44). We infer from this fact -
support for our earlier assumption that interpersonal con- 
tact, e.g. via telephone, an6 television communication share 
an integrative quality not characteristic of the written 
media. 
Crittenden's factor analysis utilized a Varimax rota- 
tion, producing thereby factors that are not correlated with 
each other. It is our hypothesis, however, that bivariate 
relationships of the factor scores of the states will emerge 
when a third factor is held constant. Specifically,~we pro- 
pose that for states loading low on integrative message 
exchange there will be a positive relationship between metro- 
urbanis'm and scope of government. When integrative message 
exchange is high, however, this relationship will be inverse. 
These expectations are confirmed by table 4. Scope of 
government is highest under conditions of uncoordinated 
development: high communication flow, low degree of struc- 
tural complexity, and low communication flow, high degree of 
structural complexity. These data are easier to visualize as 
a scatter diagram, and are presented in that form in figure 4. 
Clearly, the relationship between metro-urbanism and scope 
of government is stronger for those states loading high on 
integrative message exchange than for those with low loadings 
on this factor. 
Table 4. Mean loading on "scope of government," by integra- 





Low integrative- High integrative 
message exchange message exchange 
SOURCE: John Crittenden, "Dimensions of Moderniza- 
tion in the American States," American 
Political Science Review, LXI, 4, p. 998. 
Figure 4. Loadings on metro-urbanism and scope of government, by loading on 
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Loading on 'metro-urbanism' 
The Mass Society Model As An Evolutionary Scheme. 
Kornhauser has defined mass society in terms of how 
accessible the elite is to pressures from below, and how 
available the general population is for mobilization by the 
elite. 2 8  Integrative communication may be assumed to 
facilitate the accessibility of the elite to the extent to 
which it is not controlled by the elite, while increased 
social structural complexity, especially the concentration 
of populations in cities and large-scale productive organiza- 
tions, increases the availability of non-elites. Note, for 
example, the use to which the Communist Party has put the 
workers cell. *' Given these relationships, we can in fact 
translate the present analysis into Kornhauser's typology 
of communal, pluralistic, totalitarian, and mass societies. 
Moreover, when viewed in a developmental context, Lerner's 
differentiation of media-production and media-consumption 
becomes more meaningful than the notions of 'transitional' 
and 'modern' societies. Those societies characterized by 
how social differentiation and low communication density will, 
in Kornhauser's terms, have low availability of non-elites, 
and low accessibility of elites. This traditional form of 
social organization appears in Kornhauser's theory as 
"communal society." 
Since we have argued that stratification systems and 
communication systems may increase in complexity independently 
of each other, development beyond the communal society may, in 
the 'transitional' phase, be characterized by high social 
. differentiation and low communication density, or by low 
social differentiation and high communication density. The 
former, where we postulate that modern media of communication 
have not developed enough to adequately integrate a society 
replete with new structural complexities--Lerner8s media . '  
production phase--is mass society. The social distance 
between elites and non-elites has beenwidened, and the gulf. 
cannot be,bridged by communications up or down. The latter 
case--and the only one in our own typology that does not appear 
in Kornhauser's scheme--is the- modern agricultural society, 
which has adopted advanced technologies, but the economy of 
which is still based on extractive rather than manufacturing 
industries. Both of these types would be regarded as 
'transitional' societies, but the former has not yet entered 
the media consumption phase. See figure 5. 
If the communications industry develops to the point at 
which it can integrate a highly differentiated society, the 
mass society phase is passed. Depending upon the focus of 
control of the media, society can then be characterized as 
totalitarian or pluralistic, depending upon the degree of 
centralized control. 
30 
This of course does not discount the 
possibility of totalitarian regimes in modern agricultural 
states. Indeed, the logical extension of this scheme would 
be to differentiate these societies on the basis of centraliza- 
tion of control of communications. 
Figure 5. Evolutionary scheme of social differentiation and 
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Note finally-that our placement of the modern agricul- 
tural society in the transitional phase reflects popular 
usage in the- social sciences, and implicit assumptions in 
the foreign policies of major contemporary world powers. We 
in fact prefer the image of an agricultural state protected 
by technology from the vicissitudes of climate to a world in 
which the strains of.industrialization have.been super- 
imposed on every extant cultural system. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See William F. Ogburn; Social: Change. (New York: Viking 
Press, 1950), pp. 20'0 ff. 
2.. Karl W. Deutsch; .Nationalism and Social Communication 
(second edition; Cambridge':. M.'I.T. Press;;'l966) ,'pp. 86- 
106. 
3. See for example Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Govern- 
ment: Models of Political Communication and Control 
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 77. 
Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Develop- 
ment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 6. -
Alexis de ~ocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: 
Knopf, 1945), vol. I, pp. 248-249. For the case of the 
newer developing nations see Lucian W. Pye, Politics, 
Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1962), p. 25. 
See Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: 
Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) , pp. 109 ff. 
See Ithiel de Sola Pool's- forthcoming report on acquaint- 
anceship networks, and Edward 0. Laumann and Louis- 
Guttman; "The Relative ~ssociational Contiguity of 
Occupation in Urban Settings;" American .~ociolb~ical 
Review, vo1.,31, no. 2, pp. 169-178. . . 
See Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Persona 
ence: The Part Plaved hv- Peoole i n the. Fl n w  c 
Verling C. Troldahl and Robert Van Dam, "Face-To-Face 
Communications about Major Topics in the News," Public 
Opinion Quarterly, vol., xxix, no. 4 (Winter, 1965-66) , 
p. 628. 
Pye, Comrnunicat.ion,s and Political Deve.lopment, p. 26. 
. . 
Phillips Cutright,.."National Political Development: 
Measurement and Analysis;" American Sociological Review, 
vol. 28,.no. 2 (April, 1963), pp. 253-264. See also 
Ne1son"W. Polsby et al. (eds.), Politics and Social Life 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19631, pp. 574 ff. 
The index of communication development was based upon 
newspaper- and newsprint consumption, telephones, and 
the number of pieces of domestic mail per capita. 
13. Daniel Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social 
Systems--A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," 
in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political 
Development and Social Chanqe (New York: Wiley, 1966), 
pp. 195-205. 
Donald .J. McCrone. and Charles F. .Cnudde, "Toward a 
Communications Theory of- Democratic-.Political Develop- 
ment: A Causal ~odei; ". ~merican: Political' Science - 
Review,.vol. LXI, no. 1, March, 1967,.pp.'72-79. ' . . 
Seymour Martin Lipset;--The First New Nation: The 
United .States in Historical and:Comparative Perspec- 
tive (New York: ' Basic Books. 1963) . For a statement - - - - - - - - - 
of the role of pre-electronic media in integrating 
the American colonies see Richard L. Merritt, Symbols 
of American Community: 1735-1775 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966). 
William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society 
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1959) , p. 33. 
Ibid., pp. 93 ff. 
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), pp. 298 ff. 
See Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp. 82-83, and V. 0. Key, Jr., 
Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 
1965), pp. 345 ff. 
For a discussion of this assumption see David R. Segal, 
The Socialization of Adolescent Politicians (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation; University of Chicago, 1967), 
chapter 2. 
See, for example, Marshall McLuhan, understanding Media 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 22-23. 
See Daniel Lerner,.The Passing of-Traditional Society 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, .1964), p. 87. 
Cf. Seymour. Martin Lipset; Politi.ca1 Man (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1963), pp. 27 ff. 
Lerner, The Passing of.Traditiona1 Society, p. 87. 
Indices of normative integration other than political 
behavior yield the same pattern observed above. A study 
of incendiary forest fires.in the United States, believed 
to be related to the imposition of controls by the United 
States Forest Service on previously uncontrolled lands, 
has shown that the rate of fire starts is roughly two 
times. higher. in counties having a high 1evel.of social 
differentiation (as measured .by per..cent of population 
employed in manufacturing) and a low: comrnun-ication 
density (as measured by.nurnber of telephones per- 
capita) than in counties. having any other: combination 
of these characteristics. I am indebted-to R. Brooks 
Sibley of the School of Forestry, University of Michigan, 
for making these data available to me. 
26. Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson, 
The Ruler and the Ruled (New York: Wiley, 1964) , p. 7. 
27. The data are taken- from John.Crittenden, "Dimensions 
of Modernization in the American States;" American. 
Political Science Review; vol. LXI, no. 4;:December, 
1967, pp. 989-1001. 
28. Kornhauswer, op..cit., p.-40. 
29. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 
1963), p. 27. 
30. See Paul Kecskemeti, "Totalitarian Communications as a 
Means of Control," Public ,Opinion Quarterly, vol. XIV 
(Summer, 1950) , pp. 224-234'. 
